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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                     
No. 09-2946
                    
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY;
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY
v.
AMERICAN REHAB AND PHYSICAL THERAPY, INC.
doing business as AMERICAN MEDICAL REHAB; 
RICHARD PRIVITERA; DEAN PARKER; STEVE MOLDOVER
Richard Privitera,
Appellant
                    
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-03-cv-05595)
District Judge: Hon. Michael M. Baylson
                    
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 13, 2010
BEFORE: FISHER, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 15, 2010)
                    
OPINION
                    
COWEN, Circuit Judge
2Richard Privitera appeals an order of the District Court enjoining Privitera from
making any monthly expenditures in excess of $6,710 and ordering him to make monthly
payments of $3,700 to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”)
on a judgment of $500,000 that State Farm obtained against him.  We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
State Farm obtained a default judgment against Privitera in the amount of
$500,000, which Privitera did not appeal.  Subsequently, State Farm pursued post-
judgment asset discovery.  Privitera engaged in a variety of dilatory tactics but ultimately
State Farm deposed him and obtained information on his assets.  State Farm then moved
for a preliminary injunction enjoining Privitera from making any monthly expenditures in
excess of $6,710 and ordering him to make monthly payments of $3,700 to State Farm
toward satisfaction of the default judgment award.  
The District Court conducted a hearing and concluded that Privitera:  (1) withheld
financial information from State Farm, (2) earned approximately $200,000 annually from
his consulting business, (3) structured his lifestyle and expenses in a manner to avoid
accumulating assets to prevent payments to State Farm, (4) lived a luxurious lifestyle in
comparison with the typical debtor, as he rented a home in a gated community and he and
his wife leased expensive vehicles, (5) claimed excessive monthly food expenditures
($1,700), and (6) claimed unnecessary and unsupported monthly entertainment
expenditures ($1,200).  The District Court determined that Privitera’s monthly
3expenditures totaled $6,710 and that Privitera could afford to make monthly payments to
State Farm in the amount of $3,700.  The District Court granted State Farm’s motion,
thereby ordering Privitera to refrain from making any monthly expenditures in excess of
$6,710 and to commence monthly payments of $3,700.   
II. DISCUSSION
We “review an order granting a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, the
factual findings for clear error, and the determinations of questions of law de novo.” 
Bennington Foods LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance Group, LLP, 528 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir.
2008).  To determine whether to grant a request for a preliminary injunction, district
courts engage in a four-step inquiry evaluating:  “(1) whether the movant has shown a
reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be
irreparably injured by denial of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will
result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the
preliminary relief will be in the public interest.”  A.C.L.U. v. Black Horse Pike Bd. of
Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996).  
Privitera contends that the District Court erred at each step.  We reject each of his
contentions.  First, State Farm undoubtedly has prevailed on the merits of its case.  State
Farm obtained a default judgment in its favor, which Privitera did not appeal.  There is
nothing left for the parties to litigate with respect to the merits of State Farm’s claims
against Privitera.
4Second, State Farm would face irreparable harm if the District Court denied its
request for a preliminary injunction.  The dilatory and misleading tactics that Privitera
engaged in after he defaulted demonstrate his willingness to evade payment.  Further, at
the time Privitera filed this appeal, he had paid nothing to State Farm, despite several
promises of payment, including a check for $25,000 that bounced.  The record
demonstrates that a money judgment alone is insufficient motivation for Privitera. 
Without this injunction, Privitera would continue to conceal assets and to spend his
disposable income in a manner that would further evade State Farm’s collection efforts.  
Third, the District Court’s order will not result in greater harm to Privitera.  The
District Court’s order permits Privitera to continue living in his gated community and
driving his expensive vehicles.  Privitera contends that any attempts to enforce the
preliminary injunction by means of contempt proceedings that then result in coercive
incarceration would amount to sending him to “debtor’s prison” due to his inability to
pay.  This contention lacks merit.  The record clearly demonstrates Privitera’s ability to
pay and the only reason that he would face potential incarceration is if he chose to evade
his obligations to State Farm.    
Finally, the grant of this preliminary injunction is in the public’s interest.  The
public has an interest in the enforcement of judgments.  Privitera contends that the order
amounts to a de facto garnishment of his wages in violation of 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8127. 
Under § 8127, “[t]he wages, salaries and commissions of individuals shall while in the
5hands of the employer be exempt from any attachment, execution or other process . . . .” 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8127 (emphasis added).  The plain text of this statute demonstrates
that it does not apply to a judgment creditor’s attempts to obtain payment from wages in
the hands of a judgment debtor.  Thus, the order is not in conflict with any public policies
regarding wages.   
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting a
preliminary injunction. 
